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ABSTRACT 
The Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) forced corporations to examine their spreadsheet use in 
financial reporting. Corporations do not like what they are seeing. Surveys conducted in response 
to SOX show that spreadsheets are used widely in corporate financial reporting. Spreadsheet 
error research, in turn, shows that nearly all large spreadsheets contain multiple errors and that 
errors of material size are quite common. The first round of Sarbanes-Oxley assessments 
confirmed concerns about spreadsheet accuracy. Another concern is spreadsheet fraud, which 
also exists in practice and is easy to perpetrate. Unfortunately, few organizations maintain 
effective controls to deal with either errors or fraud. This paper examines spreadsheet risks for 
Sarbanes-Oxley (and other regulations) and discusses how general and IT-specific control 
frameworks can be used to address the control risks created by spreadsheets. 
KEYWORDS: CobiT, controls, control deficiency, control framework, COSO, end-user computing 
(EUC), error, error rate floor, formula error rate (FER), fraud, 17799, ITIL, material error, 
spreadsheet. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
CONTROLS AND SARBANES-OXLEY 
After financial reporting scandals at Enron and other major companies, the U.S. Congress passed 
the Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002. Section 404 of the Act requires nearly every public 
company’s chief corporate officers to assess whether the company’s financial reporting system 
was effectively controlled during the reporting period. Furthermore, it specifies that the company 
must hire an independent external auditor to assess the officers’ assessment. 
To oversee SOX, Congress created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB) 
to create auditing standards. PCAOB’s main guidance on 404 assessments of control attestations 
is Auditing Standard No. 2, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in 
Conjunction with an Audit of Financial Statements (PCAOB, 2004). 
The focus of SOX and of Auditing Standard 2 is the creation of effective controls. Figure 1 
illustrates that controls are ways to help a corporation achieve its objectives, such as producing 
accurate financial reports—despite the presence of threats. 
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Figure 1: Controls 
_____________________________________________________ 
Controls are ways to help a corporation achieve its objectives, such as producing 
accurate financial reports—despite the presence of threats. 
_____________________________________________________ 
 
Controls cannot guarantee that the goals will be met, but they reduce the risk that these 
objectives will not be met. In this context, effectively controlled financial reporting processes give 
reasonable assurance that the company will meet the goal of producing accurate financial 
reports. 
Effectively controlled financial reporting processes give reasonable assurance 
that the company will meet the goal of producing accurate financial reports. 
According to Auditing Standard 2, an internal control deficiency exists when the design or 
operation of a control does not allow for the timely prevention or detection of misstatements. The 
standard (PCAOB, 2004) defines two types of deficiencies: 
• In a significant deficiency, there is more than a remote likelihood that the financial 
statements will be impacted in a manner that is consequential but not material. 
• In a material deficiency, there is “a significant deficiency, or combination of significant 
deficiencies, that results in more than a remote likelihood that a material misstatement of 
the annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected” (PCAOB, 
2004). Vorhies (2005) indicates that a 5% error in revenues is the usual threshold for 
labeling a deficiency as material because a smaller difference is not likely to sway a 
reasonable investor. 
This distinction between significant and material internal control deficiencies is important because 
if management finds even a single material deficiency, it may not assess its internal controls as 
having been effective during the reporting period. 
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According to the PCAOB’s analysis, 12% of all audits in 2004 and the first part of 2005 assessed 
companies as not effectively controlling their financial reporting function (Rankin, 2005). The 
situation may actually be much worse because only larger firms were required to assess their 
financial reporting systems during that period. In addition, auditors tended to focus on strikingly 
out-of-control aspects of financial reporting systems. 
Failing an audit of the effectiveness of financial controls can be very costly to a company. The 
research firm Glass, Lewis & Company analyzed 899 cases in which firms reported material 
weaknesses (Durfee, 2005). They discovered that companies experienced an average stock 
price drop of 4% right after the announcement. In turn, the Dutch research firm ARC Morgan 
found in 2004 that in more than 60% of all cases, the chief financial officer (CFO) was replaced 
within three months after a companies reported material weaknesses (Durfee, 2005). 
II. WHAT ABOUT ALL THE SPREADSHEETS? 
THE USE OF SPREADSHEETS IN FINANCIAL REPORTING 
Auditing Standard No. 2 clarifies that controls must involve all forms of information technology (IT) 
used in financial reporting. One particular IT concern for corporations is the use of spreadsheets 
in financial reporting. There have long been indications that many spreadsheets are large (Cale, 
1994; Cragg and King, 1993; Floyd, et al., 1995; Hall, 1996), complex (Hall, 1996), and very 
important to their firms (Chan and Storey, 1996; Gable, et al., 1991; Hall, 1996). When 
Comshare, Inc.1 surveyed 700 finance and budgeting professionals in the mid-1990s, it found 
that spreadsheets already dominated budgeting (Modern Office Technology, 1994). 
Although some people might doubt that companies use spreadsheets in critical financial reporting 
operations, the widespread use of spreadsheets is well documented, thanks to surveys motivated 
by concerns over SOX. 
• In 2004, financial intelligence firm CODA reported that 95% of U.S. firms use 
spreadsheets for financial reporting (www.coda.com ). 
• RevenueRecognition.com (2004) (now Softtrax) sponsored interviews by the International 
Data Corporation of 118 U.S. business leaders. IDC found that 85% were using 
spreadsheets in financial reporting and forecasting. 
• CFO.com (Durfee, 2004) interviewed 168 finance executives in 2004. The interviews 
asked about information technology use in the finance department. Out of 14 
technologies discussed, only two were widely used—spreadsheets and basic budgeting 
and planning systems. Every subject said that his or her department used spreadsheets. 
• In Europe, A.R.C. Morgan interviewed 376 individuals responsible for overseeing SOX 
compliance in multinationals that do business in the United States (TMCnet.com, 2004). 
These respondents came from 21 different countries. More than 80% of the respondents 
said that their firms used spreadsheets both for managing the financial reporting control 
environment and for financial reporting itself. 
• In a webcast for Delloite on May 22, 2005, the author was able to ask a series of 
questions of the audience. The average response size was just over 800 financial 
professionals and officers in corporations. One question specifically asked, “Does your 
firm use spreadsheets of material importance in financial reporting?” Of the respondents, 
87.7% answered in affirmative, while 7.1% said, “No.” (Another 5.2% chose “Not 
Applicable.”) 
                                                     
1 Comshare was bought up by Geac in 2003. Geac, in turn was bought up by Golden gate Capital 
in March 2006andmade part of Extensity.  
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Furthermore, when companies use spreadsheets for financial reporting, they often use many. 
One firm used more than 200 spreadsheets in its financial planning process. 
Today, companies are widely confused over what to do about spreadsheet controls. Obviously, if 
financial reporting spreadsheets contain a significant number of errors and a reasonable amount 
of testing has not been done, it is difficult to say that the reporting process is well controlled. 
LACK OF CONTROLS, INCLUDING TESTING 
One concern with spreadsheets is that they rarely are well-controlled (Cragg and King, 1993; 
Davies and Ikin, 1987; Fernandez, 2002; Floyd, et al., 1995; Gosling, 2003; Hall, 1996; Hendry 
and Green, 1994; Nardi, 1993; Nardi and Miller, 1991; Schultheis and Sumner, 1994). This 
situation is not surprising because few organizations implement serious control policies—or 
indeed any policies at all—for spreadsheet development (Cale, 1994; Fernandez, 2002; Floyd, et 
al., 1995; Galletta and Hufnagel, 1992; Hall, 1996; Speier and Brown, 1996). 
A specific concern is testing. Although there has long been evidence that spreadsheet error is 
widespread, organizations rarely mandate that spreadsheets and other end user applications be 
tested after development (Cale, 1994; Cragg and King, 1993; Floyd, et al., 1995; Galletta and 
Hufnagel, 1992; Gosling, 2003; Hall, 1996; Speier and Brown, 1996). Furthrmore, individual 
developers rarely engage in systematic testing on their own spreadsheets after development 
(Cragg and King, 1993; Davies and Ikin, 1987; Hall, 1996; Schultheis and Sumner, 1994). 
As noted earlier, the author was able to ask questions of corporate financial professionals and 
officers in a webcast. Figure 2 shows respondent answers to the question, “For spreadsheets of 
material importance used in financial reporting, what percentage does your company test?” 
Seventeen percent of the respondents said that their firm tests more than 25% of their material 
financial spreadsheets, and 16% said that their firm tests nearly all. 
Table 1: Testing for Material Financial Spreadsheets 
Response to “For Spreadsheets of Material Importance Used in Financial Reporting, What 
Percentage Does Your Company Test?” 
 
Almost None 24%
Under 10% 20%
11% to 25% 12%
Over 25% 17%
Nearly All 16%
Not Applicable 11%
Total 100%
Respondents 862
                                                Source: Panko (2005c). 
These results make it appear that many companies do test their spreadsheets. However, what 
most respondents call testing appears to be “looking over the spreadsheet,” rather than 
comprehensive cell-by-cell testing. Later in the webcast, participants were queried about their 
firms’ testing of spreadsheets of material importance used in financial reporting. Figure 2 shows 
the results. Note that only 12% of the respondents said that their firms tested all cells. In addition, 
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which of the following methods does it use?
 
Source: Panko (2005c). 
Figure 2. Extent of Testing and Multiperson Testing 
 
only 2% said that they both tested all cells and used multiperson testing. As we will see later, only 
testing all cells and using multiple testers is likely to be an effective control for spreadsheet errors. 
This lack of comprehensive testing may exist because developers tend to be overconfident of the 
accuracy of their untested spreadsheets. Certainly, widespread overconfidence, often in the face 
of widespread errors, has been observed repeatedly in spreadsheet research (Brown and Gould, 
1987; Davies and Ikin, 1987; Floyd, et al., 1995; Panko and Halverson, 1997; Panko 2006c). 
In a vicious cycle, organizations that do not test their spreadsheets get no feedback on real error 
rates and so do not realize the ubiquity of spreadsheet errors. Therefore, they see no need for 
testing. Rasmussen (1974) noted that people use stopping rules to decide when to stop doing 
activities such as testing. If people are overconfident, they are likely to stop too early. 
Consequently, if firms use spreadsheets to make decisions but do not test their spreadsheets, 
they may not realize how many errors their spreadsheets contain. 
One might argue that the real world would provide painful feedback if a spreadsheet were 
incorrect. For some situations, such as budgeting, errors would have to be small in order to pass 
undetected. Unfortunately, in this case, even small percentage errors can be quite damaging. 
Hicks (1995) found that a relatively small percentage error in the capital budgeting spreadsheet 
he examined would have produced an error of several hundred million dollars. Yet this difference 
was too small, compared to the total, to be detected easily by “checking the result for 
reasonableness.” 
At the other extreme, when a new situation is modeled, such as the purchase of another 
company, even large errors in the spreadsheet might not be obvious. If a promising corporate 
purchase goes bad, furthermore, it is easy to dismiss the problem as being due to unforeseen 
factors, even if the real problem was a spreadsheet error. Without testing, real-world feedback 
may not be effective. 
THE PREVALENCE OF SPREADSHEET ERRORS 
Are errors common in spreadsheets? For most people, the most convincing data on spreadsheet 
errors come from audits of real-world operational spreadsheets. Table 2, which presents data 
from several audit studies, shows convincingly that spreadsheet errors are extremely common. 
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• First, these audits found errors in the vast majority (94%) of the spreadsheets they 
audited. This percentage would have been even higher, but several of the studies only 
reported serious errors. In other words, we should expect nearly all spreadsheets to 
contain errors. In fact, when the author discussed spreadsheet errors with the principals 
of two spreadsheet auditing firms in the UK, both said that they had never audited a 
major spreadsheet without finding errors. 
Table 2. Audits of Real-World Spreadsheets 
Authors Year Number of 
Spreadsheets 
Audited 
Average 
Size 
(Cells) 
Percent of 
Spreadsheets 
with Errors 
Cell 
Error 
Rate 
Comment 
Hicks 1995 1 3,856 100% 1.2% One omission error would have caused an error of more than a 
billion dollars. 
Coopers & 
Lybrand 
1997 23 More than 
150 
rows 
91%   Off by at least 5%. At 5%, financial errors are considered to be 
material (Vorhies, 2005). 
KPMG 1998 22   91%   Only significant errors that could affect decisions. 
Lukasic 1998 2 2,270 & 7,027 100% 2.2%, 2.5% 
In Model 2, the investment's value 
was overstated by 16%. Quite 
serious. 
Butler 2000 7   86% 0.4% Only errors large enough to require additional tax payments.* 
Clermont, 
Hanin, & 
Mittermeier 
2002 3   100% 1.3%, 
6.7%, 
0.1% 
Computed on the basis of non-
empty cells. 
Interview I** 2003 ~36 / yr   100%   Approximately 5% had extremely 
serious errors. 
Interview II** 2003 ~36 / yr   100%   Approximately 5% had extremely 
serious errors. 
Lawrence and 
Lee 
2004 30 2,182 
unique 
formulas 
100% 6.9% 30 most financially significant 
spreadsheets audited by Mercer 
Finance & Risk Consulting in 
previous year. 
Total/Average   88   94% 5.2%   
*The low cell error rate probably reflects the fact that the methodology did not inspect all formulas in the spreadsheet but 
focused on higher-risk formulas. However, error has a strong random component, so the practice of not checking all 
formulas is likely to miss many errors. 
**In 2003, the author spoke independently with experienced spreadsheet auditors in two different companies in the United 
Kingdom, where certain spreadsheets must be audited by law. Each company audited about three dozen spreadsheets 
per year. Both said that they had never seen a major spreadsheet that was free of errors. Both also indicated that about 
five percent of the spreadsheets they audited have very serious errors that would have had major ramifications had they 
not been caught. Audits were done by single auditors, so from the research on spreadsheet and software auditing, it is 
likely that half or fewer of the errors had been caught. In addition, virtually all of the spreadsheets had standard formats 
required for their specific legal purposes, so error rates may have been lower than they would be for purpose-built 
spreadsheet designs. 
Source: Panko (2005c). 
• Second, these audits found many errors in the spreadsheets they audited. Specifically, 
studies that measured errors on a per-cell or per-formula basis (Butler, 2000; Clermont, 
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et al., 2002; Hicks, 1995; Lawrence and Lee, 2004; Lukasic, 1998) found errors in an 
average of 5.2% of the cells or formulas in these spreadsheets. Most large spreadsheets 
have thousands of formula cells, so these large spreadsheets probably have dozens or 
even hundreds of errors. 
If this cell/formula error rate (CER/FER) seems excessive, it should not. There has been a great 
deal of research on human error (cf. Panko, 2006a), and for tasks of comparable complexity, 
such as writing computer program statements, similar error rates are seen universally. Panko 
(2006a) has summarized results from a number of studies that measured fault rates in real-world 
software. Of particular value are four large studies (Ebenau and Strauss, 1994; Madachy, 1996; 
O’Neill, 1994; Weller, 1993). In these studies, the average error rate per line of code ranged from 
1.5% to 2.6%. Note that this value is close to the cell/formula error rates seen in Table 2 for 
spreadsheet code inspections. Grady (1992) and Zage and Zage (1993) both found that software 
error rates depend on program difficulty. In both studies, fault rates were at least twice as high for 
difficult programs as for simple programs. 
All humans appear to have an error rate floor (ERF) that exists even when they are working very 
carefully. Working more carefully can decrease a person’s error rate only modestly. Research 
shows that the same human cognitive processes that allow us to respond to the world correctly 
most of the time have unavoidable trade-offs that create errors a few percent of the time (Reason, 
1990). In most human cognitive activities, such small error rates are only minor nuisances, if 
anyone notices them at all. However, when dozens of formula cells are on a chain to calculate a 
bottom-line financial value, the probability of error in the bottom-line value becomes 
unacceptable. 
BUT ARE THE ERRORS MATERIAL? 
Errors are only bad if they are large enough to make a difference. Perhaps financial professionals 
in corporations catch all errors large enough to cause problems. Unfortunately, that is not the 
case. 
An obvious issue for Sarbanes–Oxley is many spreadsheet errors are material. As noted earlier, 
a 5% error in an important bottom-line value in a key financial variable would probably be 
considered a material error (Vorhies, 2005). When Panko (2006b) interviewed two spreadsheet 
auditing principals, both independently gave data suggesting that about 5% of all spreadsheets 
contain what one of the interviewees called “show stopper” errors. However, these show-stopper 
errors were far larger than simple materiality. 
More to the point, the Coopers and Lybrand (1997) study shown in Table 2 did not report an error 
unless there was at least a 5% error in a bottom line value, that is, a material error. The study 
found such errors in 91% of all spreadsheets. KPMG (1998) found a similar error rate and only 
reported spreadsheets to be incorrect if they contained errors that would make a difference to 
decision makers. 
The Coopers and Lybrand (1997) study shown in Table 2 did not report an error 
unless there was at least a 5% error in a bottom line value, that is, a material 
error. 
More indirectly, the following studies present data from software testing that classified errors 
found as major or minor. Although definitions about what constitutes a major error differ, all 
software audit studies that used major/minor distinction found that major errors are very common. 
• Bush (1994) and Jones (1998) both reported that a quarter of the errors in the 
inspections they examined were major errors. 
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• O’Neill (1994) found only 13% of errors to be major. 
• Schulmeyer (1999) found that 42% of all errors were major. 
• Ebenau and Strauss (1994) and Weller (1993) found major errors in 1.4% to 2.8% of the 
lines of code examined but did not report major errors as a percentage of total errors. 
Given this data from software inspections, it certainly would be risky to assume that nearly all 
spreadsheet errors will be minor. 
THE PROSPECT OF SPREADSHEET FRAUD 
Although the research on spreadsheet error is extensive, no formal research exists on 
spreadsheet fraud. Legal definitions of fraud vary. Generally speaking, a fraud exists when one 
person knowingly lies (or conceals information whose nondisclosure would make other 
statements misleading) in order to get the victim to act in a way contrary to the victim’s interests. 
Note that two elements are needed for there to be fraud: deception and harm. 
Concern that spreadsheet developers will manipulate their spreadsheet assumptions to make the 
results look better for their bargaining position goes back many years (Levy, 1984). Few people 
would consider minor “puffery” to be fraud. However, when as the degree of deception and the 
damage due to deception increase in intensity, then spreadsheet misanalysis eventually rises to 
the level of fraud. 
HM Revenue & Customs 
Spreadsheet fraud is not just a theoretical concern. In the United Kingdom, Her Majesty’s 
Revenue & Customs2 collects certain types of taxes. When spreadsheets became prevalent in 
tax submissions, the agency began to audit submitted spreadsheets and found that many 
contained substantial errors. In the late 1990s, the agency developed a program to automate 
many aspects of this auditing process (Butler, 2000): SpACE: Spreadsheet Auditing by Customs 
& Excise. (HM Revenue & Customs was previously called HM Customs & Excise.)  In addition to 
looking for innocent errors, SpACE also looks for certain types of fraud that the agency had found 
in earlier audits. For example, the program highlights any numbers that are entered as text. Excel 
treats text cells as having the value zero. Consequently, entering a number in a column of 
numbers as text reduces the real total. This change creates a fraudulent reduction in tax 
payments. Although HM Revenue & Customs does not published detailed information on its 
findings, staff members state that nearly all adjustments require additional taxes rather than tax 
rebates. 
The Allfirst Fraud Scandal 
The most famous case of spreadsheet fraud occurred at Allfirst, a former U.S. subsidiary of Allied 
Irish Banks (AIB) in Ireland. AIB commissioned Eugene Ludwig, former U.S. Comptroller of the 
Currency, to prepare a report on the incident. The story his report tells is an excellent cautionary 
tale. 
Allfirst currency trader John Rusnak began losing money in his trades around 1997. He used a 
series of spreadsheet subterfuges to hide his losses, which continued to increase. When the 
fraud was finally discovered, his losses amounted to $691.2 million. Although neither Allfirst nor 
Allied Irish Banks (AIB) went into receivership, the losses amounted to 60% of AIB’s 2001 
revenues and produced a major drop in AIB’s stock price. After the scandal, AIB sold off its Allfirst 
subsidiary. 
                                                     
2 England’s equivalent of the U.S. Inernal Revenue Service (IRS) 
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Rusnak began by entering two false option trades in the company’s trading system—the receipt 
of a large premium and the payment of a large premium. The first option would expire the day of 
the trade, the other one later. Allfirst had no reports on options that expired the same day they 
were purchased and so did not detect what Rusnak was doing. The second option created a false 
asset on the company’s books which offset the real losing position that Rusnak wished to hide. 
Initially, Rusnak used fake broker confirmations to validate his fictitious deals. This method was 
risky because the back office staff reconciled trades with receipts. However, Rusnak convinced 
back-office personnel that they did not have to confirm the trades because they were offsetting 
deals with no transfer of cash. 
In 2001, the head of treasury funds at Allfirst noted that Rusnak’s trades were using up an 
unusually large portion of his balance sheet, disproportionate to his earnings. He ordered Rusnak 
to reduce his exposure on the balance sheet. Rusnak did so, but he accomplished this exposure 
reduction by using highly risky trades that saddled the company with massive potential liabilities. 
One control at Allfirst was to compute a value-at-risk (VaR) ratio for each trader. The data for 
these calculations were supposed to be computed independently by the back office staff, but 
Rusnak was able to persuade them to use data on his computer. He manipulated this data to 
make his VaR ratio look acceptable. 
The fraud came apart when a back office supervisor noticed that Rusnak’s trades were not being 
confirmed as required by procedures. The supervisor discovered that a number of trades were 
clearly bogus. He notified management of the problem. The fraud quickly unraveled. 
Rusnak eventually entered into a plea agreement that sentenced him to seven years in jail. This 
relatively light sentence was a result of his agreeing to work with prosecutors to prosecute people 
in other companies whose actions prolonged the time it took for Rusnak’s scheme to unravel 
(BBC, 2002). 
SPREADSHEETS AND ACTUAL SOX DEFICIENCY REPORTS 
Although it seems difficult to ignore the specter of spreadsheet error and fraud control deficiency, 
many firms dismissed these issues as “theoretical.” Based on the first round of Sarbanes–Oxley 
reports, this attitude no longer seems to be an intelligent reaction. 
Although most first-round Sarbanes–Oxley assessments only focused on the most glaring 
weaknesses, a number of firms did report material deficiencies because of spreadsheets. In 
2005, RSM McGladrey studied the details of initial assessment reports and summarized this 
research by saying that “numerous” companies already cited deficiencies because of 
spreadsheets (Kelly, 2005). Weaknesses included both operational control deficiencies and 
errors. 
Jack Ciesielski, publisher of the Analyst’s Accounting Observer, reported several specific cases 
of deficiency reports related to spreadsheets (MacDonald, 2005). Unfortunately, the wording in 
SEC filings typically is extremely vague. For example, Eastman-Kodak merely reported that a 
major error in its financial reporting resulted from a “failure” in its “preventive and detective 
controls surrounding the preparation and review of spreadsheets that include new or changed 
formulas” (MacDonald, 2005). In many cases, reports are so vague that they do not even mention 
specific technologies, making it impossible to draw conclusions about the prevalence of 
spreadsheet errors and control weaknesses. 
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III. LEGISLATION: SOX AND BEYOND 
SARBANES–OXLEY AND FINANCIAL FRAUD 
We have seen that the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002 requires the senior executives of U.S. firms 
and the many foreign firms listed on U.S. stock exchanges to maintain effective controls for their 
financial reporting systems and to report on the effectiveness of these controls. SOX also 
requires firms to hire an external auditor to assess their assessments. For most large firms, the 
deadline to implement effective controls either passed or will pass soon. 
SOX gave the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) overall responsibility for 
implementing the law. The SEC, in turn, created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
(PCAOB) (see Section I) to develop specific rules and oversight functions to implement 
independent audits under Sarbanes-Oxley. 
Although SOX was a response to specific high-profile cases of fraud, fraud in financial reporting is 
a longstanding, major problem. In 2004, fraud through financial statements represented only 7% 
of all fraud cases studied in an ACFE survey (ACFE, 2004), but the median fraud loss for 
financial fraud was a million dollars, compared to a median loss of only $100,000 for frauds in 
general. 
OTHER FINANCIAL REGULATIONS 
Although SOX received the most attention, a number of other recent pieces of legislation also 
required corporations to reconsider their financial systems and other information systems. 
SEC Accelerated Filing Deadlines 
Since December 2002, the Securities and Exchange Commission required firms to reduce the 
time they may take to produce their quarterly and annual reports. These tighter time limits make 
designing controls more difficult because there is  less time to check for errors and violations. 
IAS/IFRS 
U.S. accounting standards are set by the U.S. Federal Accounting Standards Board (FASB), 
which creates the generally accepted accounting practices (GAAP). In turn, the International 
Accounting Standards, including the finance-specific International Financial Reporting Standards 
(IFRS), govern U.S. firms operating in Europe. 
SAS 99 
In 2002, shortly after Sarbanes-Oxley was enacted, the Auditing Standards Board produced 
Statement on Auditing Standards 99 (SAS 99), Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement 
Audit. As its name suggests, this standard requires auditors to search aggressively for fraud. 
Basel II 
Banks who do business internationally must also comply with the Basel II accord. Basel II 
requires banks to maintain sufficient capital reserves to cover probable risks. Banks that do not 
have controlled financial reporting systems or risk controls in place must set aside more capital 
reserves to reflect the risk raised by inadequate control. This reduces the amount of loans they 
can support, which in turn limits profits. Basel II gives banks a direct incentive to invest in internal 
controls to reduce risks. 
PRIVACY LAWS 
Several laws now regulate privacy and the disclosure of private information. The number of 
privacy regulations is increasing. Key regulations include the following (among others): 
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• The European Union (E. U.) Data Protection Directive of 2002 is a broad set of rules 
ensuring privacy rights in Europe. 
• Although the E. U. Data Protection Directive is the most important international privacy 
rule, many other nations with which U.S. firms do business are also developing strong 
commercial data privacy laws. 
• The U.S. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) of 1999 requires strong privacy protection in 
financial institutions. 
• The U.S. Health Information Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) of 1996 requires 
strong protection for private data in health care organizations. 
On the other hand, the U.S. Patriot Act of 2001 gives the U.S. government broad powers to see 
personal data. In some cases, the laws requiring the maintenance of privacy and laws mandating 
government access conflict. 
EARLIER COMPLIANCE ISSUES 
Although Sarbanes-Oxley is a recent concern, the control of spreadsheets has been an issue for 
some time. 
21 CFR Part 11 in the Medical Industry 
In 1997, the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) published the Code of Federal Regulation, 
Title 21, Part 11, Electronic Records; Electronic Signatures. Better known as 21 CFR Part 11, this 
regulation mandates controls over electronic documents in pharmaceuticals and other medical 
industries, especially in research and development for new drugs. It came into effect in August, 
1997. The 21 CFR Part 11 requires electronic signatures, limiting access to authorized 
individuals, operational system checks, device checks, authorization checks, written policies on 
accountability, education, appropriate experience, audit trails, records retention, and controls over 
system documentation. 
The 21 CFR Part 11 regulations are relevant to spreadsheet controls because pharmaceuticals 
and other medical companies long used spreadsheets in regulated activities. Consequently, a 
number of vendors developed software to protect repositories of spreadsheets from security 
violations (although not from errors). These products can serve a similar function in Sarbanes-
Oxley compliance. 
Y2K 
As January 1, 2000 approached, corporations around the world needed to remediate important 
computer systems for compliance with date problems. These systems included critical 
spreadsheet models. A number of software products were created to aid Y2K spreadsheet 
remediation. Some of these tools are applicable to compliance issues. For example, SCANXLS is 
a program that can search a network for spreadsheet models and provide summaries of 
discovered spreadsheets. Knowing what spreadsheets a firm uses obviously is a critical first step 
in developing an understanding of spreadsheet risks, and it is critical in creating actual controls. 
Daylight Savings Time 
At the time of this writing, Congress is considering extending the daylight savings time period. 
This change could create an enormous number of date problems for spreadsheets and other 
software. 
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INDUSTRY-SPECIFIC ACCREDITATIONS 
In addition to government regulations, many industries have specific accreditation bodies. To be 
accredited, a firm in the industry usually must comply with numerous requirements. Some of 
these requirements involve IT controls. 
THE COMPLIANCE AGE 
For working IT professionals, complying with regulations is already a very important concern and 
is likely to continue to grow in importance. Quite simply, IT entered the compliance age. 
Unfortunately, IS education has not kept pace with the growing importance of compliance in IT 
management. 
IV. CONTROL FRAMEWORKS 
To achieve compliance with SOX and other crucial regulations, companies typically adopt or are 
required to adopt a control framework. Control frameworks specify the actions that they need to 
take and how to take these actions. 
TYPES OF CONTROLS 
We saw in Figure 1 that the purpose of controls is to help organizations keep their organizational 
processes on track to achieve their firms’ goals. Figure 1 specifically shows that controls 
generally fall into one of three categories. 
• Preventive controls attempt to keep deviations from occurring in the first place. In movie 
theaters, for example, one person sells tickets but another collects them. This procedure 
is the segregation of duties. Unless the two parties collude, the person accepting the 
money for tickets cannot collect money, pocket it, and then allow the moviegoer in 
without giving him or her a ticket. 
• Detective controls attempt to detect deviations when they occur so that action can be 
taken. Periodic reconciliations between independent processes make it likely that 
deviations in one of the processes will be revealed. In the case of movie theaters, 
management reconciles the number of tickets sold with the number of tickets collected 
at the end of each day. 
• Corrective controls actually fix deviations. The restoration of backup files on a computer 
compromised by an attack is a corrective control. 
While the general taxonomy of preventative, detective, and corrective controls is useful in 
practice, it is not perfect. For instance, people realizing that detective controls are in place may be 
deterred them from misbehavior.  Therefore, the measure would actually be a preventative 
control.  
COSO 
For Sarbanes-Oxley, the PCAOB explicitly requires corporations to use a well-developed 
comprehensive control framework. Although the PCAOB does not require corporations to use a 
specific framework, it specifically listed only a single framework as acceptable.  Therefore, most 
companies use this framework to implement SOX. This is the COSO framework. 
The COSO Framework 
Although COSO is universally known by its acronym, the COSO framework actually is a 
document called Internal Control—Internal Framework (COSO, 1994). The acronym COSO 
comes from the organization that created the document, the Committee of Sponsoring 
Organizations of the Treadway Commission (www.coso.org). 
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Objectives 
Control frameworks require objectives. The COSO framework includes three objectives. 
• Operations. The firm wishes to operate effectively and efficiently. It is necessary for the 
firm to control its general internal operations to do so. 
• Financial Reporting. The firm must create accurate financial reports. This objective, of 
course, is the focus of Sarbanes–Oxley. 
• Compliance. The firm wishes to be in compliance with external regulations. In this paper, 
we are only directly concerned with SOX compliance. 
Reasonable Assurance 
Good controls cannot completely guarantee that goals will be met. However, an effective control 
environment will give reasonable assurance that goals will be met. 
COSO Framework Components 
Figure 3 shows the COSO framework. It shows that the framework includes five components. 
These are components rather than phases because they are not re time ordered. All must occur 
simultaneously, and each feeds into others continually. 
Control Environment
Risk Assessment
Control Activities
Monitoring
 
             Source: Panko (2005c). 
Figure 3: The COSO Framework 
 
• Control Environment. The component at the base of the COSO framework is the 
corporation’s control environment. This environment is the company’s overall control 
culture. It includes the “tone at the top” set by top management, the company’s 
commitment to training employees in the importance of control, the punishment of 
employees (including senior managers) who violate control rules, attention by the board 
of directors, and other broad matters. If the broad control environment is weak, other 
control elements are not likely to be effective. 
• Risk Assessment. More specifically, a company needs to assess the risks that it faces. 
Without systematic risk analysis, it is impossible to understand what level of controls to 
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apply to individual assets. Risk assessment must be an ongoing preoccupation for the 
firm because the risk environment constantly changes. 
• Control Activities. An organization will spend most of its control effort on the control 
activities that actually implement and maintain controls. This effort includes approvals 
and authorization, IT security, the separation of duties, and many other matters. Controls 
usually involve two elements. One is a general policy, which tells what must be done. The 
other is a set of procedures, which tell how to do it. 
• Monitoring. Having controls in place means nothing if organizations do not monitor and 
enforce them. Monitoring includes both human vigilance and audit trails in information 
technology. It is essential to have an independent monitoring function that is free to report 
on problems even if these problems deal with senior management. 
• Information and Communication. For the control environment, risk assessment, control 
activities, and monitoring to work well, the company needs to ensure the use of required 
information and communication across all levels of the corporations. 
Types of Control Activities 
Internal Control—Internal Framework (COSO, 1994) does not list a comprehensive set of control 
activities, probably because it is impossible to create a complete list of potential controls. 
However, the document does provide several lists of types of control activities. For example, on 
Page 49, the framework notes the existence of manual controls, computer controls, and 
management controls. On the following page, it provides the following list to consider: 
• Top Level Review—such as comparing budgets with actual performance and tightly 
monitoring major initiatives. 
• Direct Functional or Activity Management—managers who run individual operations must 
examine the appropriate reports for their level, such as loan performance in a bank’s 
lending operations. 
• Information Processing, including the enforcement of manual procedures, such as 
checking if a customer’s accounts payable value is below a certain amount before 
accepting an order. Note that information processing must focus on business processes, 
not merely on IT processes. 
• Physical Controls—such as inventories, locked cash drawers, and write-only archival 
media. 
• Performance Indicators—such as relating different sets of data to each other to check for 
inconsistencies, noting deviations from normal performance (in either direction), and 
unusual trends. 
• Segregation of Duties—requiring sensitive processes to be completed by two or more 
people, so that no single person can engage in improper activities without it becoming 
apparent. Earlier, we saw how movie theaters do this. To give another example, it is 
normal to require that one person may purchase and order, but another person will 
record it. It is also normal to ensure that no single person can both authorize and make a 
purchase. 
Controls for Information Systems 
On Pages 52-55, Internal Control—Internal Framework specifically lists controls over information 
systems. At a most basic level, the framework discusses the differences between application 
controls and general controls. 
Application Controls 
Application controls, as the name suggests, involve individual applications (such as accounting 
applications and spreadsheets), including manual operations in using them. These controls 
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include interfaces to other systems for input data, checks on input, and internal checks during 
processing to flag errors, misbehavior, and other problems. 
General Controls 
General controls cover everything beneath the applications—including computers, operating 
systems, and the network, together with manual operations in using them. General controls apply 
to making purchases, application systems development, maintenance, access controls, 
evaluating packets software, and more. The controls needed in individual applications depend on 
the quality of general controls. 
Controls for “Evolving Issues” 
The report spends approximately half of Page 55 on “evolving issues.” Only two brief paragraphs 
are devoted to end-user computing (EUC). The first paragraph simply says that EUC exists. The 
second gives the following meager guidance: 
To provide needed control for EUC systems, entity-wide policies for system development, 
maintenance, and operation should be implemented and enforced. Local processing 
environments should be governed by a level of control activities similar to the more 
traditional mainframe environment. (COSO, 1994, p. 55) 
Internal Control–Integrated Framework does not give any specific guidance on spreadsheets. In 
fact, it does not even mention them. In general, the framework is an old (1994) document that 
was written before electronic spreadsheets became important, or, probably more accurately, 
before IT control professionals realized that spreadsheets were important. 
CobiT 
COSO is a general control planning and assessment tool for corporations. For IT controls, a more 
specific framework, CobiT (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technologies) applies. 
(IT Governance Institute, 2000). In addition to creating the broad control objectives framework, 
the IT Governance Institute also developed detailed guidance for implementing the CobiT 
framework. 
The CobiT Framework 
Table 3 illustrates the CobiT framework. This framework contains four major domains, which 
follow the general systems development life cycle 
• Planning and Organization. The planning and organization domain uses 11 high-level 
control objectives that cover everything from strategic IT planning and the creation of a 
corporate information architecture to the management of specific projects. 
• Acquisition and Implementation. After planning, companies need to acquire and 
implement information systems. This domain has six high-level control objectives. 
• Delivery and Support. Most of an IT project’s life takes place after implementation. 
Consequently, the CobiT framework contains 13 high-level control objectives for delivery 
and support. This is more than any other domain. 
• Monitoring. Finally, firms must monitor their processes, assess the adequacy of internal 
controls, obtain independent assurance, and provide for independent auditing. 
Although the four domains define the scope of CobiT, they are only the beginning of CobiT. 
Beneath the four domains are 34 high-level control objectives, which Figure 6 also shows. 
Beneath these, in turn, are more than 300 detailed control objectives. CobiT also includes many 
documents that help organizations understand how to implement the framework. 
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Table 3. COSO/CobiT Framework 
   COSO Components 
C
orporate 
Level 
A
ctivity 
Level 
CobiT Objectives 
C
ontrol 
Environ.
R
isk 
A
ssess. 
C
ontrol 
A
ctivities
Info &
  
C
om
m
. 
M
onitoring 
  Planning and Organization      
X  IT strategic plan X X  X X 
X  Information architecture   X X X 
  Technological direction      
X  IT organization/relationships X   X  
  Manage IT investment      
X  Communication aims & directions X   X X 
X  Manage human resources X   X  
X  Ensure compliance    X X 
X  Assess risks  X    
  Manage projects      
X  Manage quality X  X X X 
  Acquisition and Implementation      
  Identify automated solutions      
 X Acquire/Develop app. software   X   
 X Acquire technological infrastructure   X   
 X Develop & maintain procedures   X X  
 X Install and test systems   X   
 X Manage changes   X  X 
  Delivery and Support      
 X Define and manage service levels X  X  X 
 X Manage third-party services X X X  X 
X  Manage performance and  
capacity 
  X  X 
  Ensure continuous service     X 
 X Ensure systems security   X X X 
  Identify and allocate costs      
X  Educate and train users X   X  
  Assist and advise customers      
 X Manage the configuration   X X  
 X Manage problems and incidents   X X X 
 X Manage data   X X  
X  Manage facilities  X    
 X Manage operations   X X  
  Monitoring      
X  Monitor the process    X X 
X  Assess internal control adequacy     X 
X  Obtain Independent assurance X    X 
X  Provide for independent auditing     X 
Source: IT Governance Institute (2004), Page 50. 
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Dominance in the United States 
The IT Governance Institute was created by the Information Systems Audit and Control 
Association (ISACA). ISACA, in turn, is the primary professional association for IT audit 
professionals in the United States. The Association’s certified information systems auditor (CISA) 
certification is the dominant certification for U.S. IS auditors. Therefore, it is not surprising that 
CobiT became the dominant framework for auditing IT controls in the United States. 
COSO and CobiT 
Obviously, both COSO and CobiT pertain to information technology used in financial reporting.  
Figure 3 shows how CobiT relates to COSO at a broad level. This figure illustrates that it is 
relatively simple to combine COSO with CobiT at a conceptual level, although the details are 
anything but simple. 
 
CobiT
Internal IT Controls
ISO/IEC 17799
IT Security
ITIL
General IT Best Practices
Common Criteria
Security Product Purchasing
COSO
Internal Financial Controls
 
            Source: Panko (2005c). 
Figure 3: COSO, CobiT, ISO/IEC 17799, Common Criteria, and ITIL 
 
Figure 3, which was produced by the IT Governance Institute (2004), reflects the 2000 CobiT 3 
framework rather than the new 2005 CobiT4 framework. At the level of top-level domains, the few 
changes made could be easily mapped into Figure 3. 
OTHER FRAMEWORKS 
Although COSO and CobiT dominate Sarbanes–Oxley planning in the United States, several 
other frameworks are also important.  
Figure 4 shows the general relationship between COSO, CobiT and three other frameworks—
ISO/IEC 17799, Common Criteria, and ITIL. The figure emphasizes that these frameworks 
overlap but focus on somewhat different areas. For example, CobiT, as its name implies, focuses 
specifically on controlling the entire IT process, while COSO focuses on internal financial 
reporting controls. 
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ISO/IEC 17799 
In contrast, ISO/IEC 17799, Information technology—Security techniques—Code of practice for 
information security management (ISO/IEC 17799:2005) focuses more narrowly on IT security. 
Inasmuch as security is part of IT controls, ISO/IEC 17799 can help in creating IT controls. 
ISO/IEC 17799 grew out of an earlier standards effort by the British Standards Institute. In 1995, 
the Institute produced BS 7799. This standard contains two parts. ISO and the IEC adopted Part I 
as 17799 (adding a 1 before the BSI designation). This first part is a broad code of practice. 
ISO/IEC 17799 divides security into eleven broad areas, which is subdivides in many more 
specific elements: 
• security policy; 
• organization of information security; 
• asset management; 
• human resources security; 
• physical and environmental security; 
• communications and operations management; 
• access control; 
• information systems acquisition, development and maintenance; 
• information security incident management; 
• business continuity management; and 
• compliance. 
For organizations that want certification of their standards effort, Part II of 7799 (Information 
Security Management System) contains auditable controls. Consequently, many companies 
chose to be compliant with 17799 by being certified in Part II of 7799. In 2005, ISO updated 
17799 to produce ISO/IEC 27001:2005, Information technology—Security techniques—
Information security management systems— Requirements. This standard is based on Part II of 
7799. Implementation details are now being developed. 
In other frameworks, including COSO and CobiT, companies certify themselves, sometimes with 
the concurrence of an external auditor. They lack 17799’s third-party certification process, which 
external parties may value highly. 
Common Criteria 
Figure 4 shows that the Common Criteria (ISO/IEC 15408, Information technology–Security 
techniques–Evaluation criteria for IT security) standard is even more specific. Common Criteria 
focuses on the evaluation of security products, such as firewalls. It provides a way for purchasers 
to know specifically which security features a security product claims to offer and how rigorously 
the product was developed. However, the Common Criteria approach is somewhat limited use 
because it is difficult to apply and does not provide a high level of assurance that a product 
actually is secure. 
ITIL 
Another framework for IT is the Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL). ITIL is a 
broad set of best practice guidelines for providing IT services. It is widely used in Europe and is 
becoming popular elsewhere. ITIL is highly process-oriented, specifying systematic approaches 
to implementing security and other IT services. ITIL best practices may be helpful in implementing 
other guidelines. However, ITIL does not provide the detailed guidance necessary for developing 
and implementing IT financial reporting controls. 
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PriceWaterhouseCoopers on Spreadsheets and Sarbanes–Oxley 
An Internet search with the terms “spreadsheet” and “Sarbanes,” yields many hits. Nearly all of 
these, however, are about spreadsheets used to document SOX compliance, not about how to 
control spreadsheets used in financial reporting. 
The one major exception to this silence on spreadsheet control for Sarbanes-Oxley is a six-page 
report by PriceWaterhouseCoopers (2004). This report lists a large number of controls. 
• The first control step is to inventory all of a firm’s spreadsheets that are “in scope,” that is, 
are used in financial reporting. 
• The next steps are to evaluate the riskiness of these spreadsheets, determine 
necessary controls, evaluate the existing (as-is) controls on these spreadsheets, and 
develop action plans for remediating control deficiencies. 
Other Controls 
The report also lists a number of controls that should be considered to mitigate risks inherent in 
the spreadsheet environment. 
• Change control: The authorization of change requests, testing the spreadsheet, and 
formal sign-off by another individual. 
• Version control: Ensure that only the current and approved version of each spreadsheet 
is used. Naming conventions that include version numbers, dates, and the use of 
structured directories can help in this. 
• Access control: Assign appropriate access rights to people who need to use the 
spreadsheet. Use a password to control access. 
• Input: Whether data entry is manual or automatic, use numerical reconciliations. 
• Security and data integrity: Store spreadsheets in protected directories and lock formula 
cells to prevent logic changes. 
• Documentation: Ensure that the business objective and functions of the spreadsheets are 
understandable. 
• Development life cycle: Use a standard systems development life cycle. The report 
specifically says that testing is critical (although it does not discuss how to do testing). 
• Backup and Archiving: Spreadsheets should be backed up because of their sensitivity. 
They should be archived in read-only format for later review. 
• Logic inspection. The company should use an independent person other than the 
developer for logic inspections. The report does not discuss how logic inspection is 
different from testing or discuss how it should be done. 
• Segregation of duties/roles, and procedures: The company should define authorities, 
roles, and procedures for ownership, sign-off, and other matters. This item is so brief in 
the report that it provides little guidance. 
• Analytics: The firm should require that calculations be built into spreadsheets (e.g., 
ratios, cross-checks, statistical patterns.) that help detect errors and fraud. 
The report says that firms should enforce these controls. For instance, changes should be made 
independently in two copies of each spreadsheet, and the two copies should be compared. In 
another example, a sample of cells can be tested to ensure that they are password-protected if 
they should be. In addition, names should include modification dates, and names should be 
compared with modification dates as recorded by the operating system. 
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Finally, the report gives a number of suggestions for remediation. Specific responsibilities should 
be assigned to specific people, remediation efforts should be prioritized, and remediation 
deadlines should be established. 
ISSUES WITH THE PWC SPREADSHEET FRAMEWORK 
Although the PriceWaterhouseCoopers report is extremely valuable, its weaknesses need to be 
noted. 
Lack of Detail 
One obvious problem with the PWC advice is its lack of detail. It mentions many actions but does 
not explain what these actions mean or how to implement them. The PWC framework is a 
beginning but only a beginning. 
A General Lack of Empirical Justification 
A systematic problem with the PWC framework is that it does not seem to be aware of empirical 
spreadsheet research. This lack of awareness creates a number of potential problems that we will 
discuss in the following sections. 
Modular Design 
The PWC framework argues for a modular design—breaking the spreadsheet into a number of 
reasonably self-contained modules. However, modularization is a complex topic. For example, 
some common advice on how to build modules emphasizes the desirability of placing all input 
data in one section, all processing in a second section, and all data output calculations in a final 
section. However, this IPO approach makes the processing section difficult to read, and it 
necessitates that formulas will require pointing to numbers far away. This approach can lead to 
an increased number of pointing errors. The alternative to input-processing-output (IPO) is to use 
a basic top-to-bottom design in which numbers are presented in the context of previous numbers 
and calculations. (If you use a tax preparation program, you will note that input is put in the 
context of a stream of calculations rather than all at the front.) The organization of modules is 
very much an open research question. 
Assessing Risk: Length versus Complexity 
One concern is the report’s method for assessing riskiness. It lists nine factors to consider when 
evaluating the “risk and significance” of a spreadsheet: 
• Complexity of the spreadsheet and calculations. 
• Purpose and use of the spreadsheet. 
• Number of spreadsheet users. 
• Types of potential input, logic, and interface errors. 
• Size of the spreadsheet. 
• Degree of understanding and documentation of the spreadsheet requirements by the 
developer. 
• Uses of the spreadsheet’s output. 
• Frequency and extent of changes and modifications to the spreadsheet. 
• Development, including testing of the spreadsheet before it is utilized. 
Although this is a good list generally, some of it reflects an incorrect view of spreadsheet errors. 
Research indicates that the largest indicator of the number of errors in a spreadsheet is simply 
the length of the spreadsheet. As in programming, there will be errors in about 2% of all formula 
cells if there is no deep testing.. From programming, we know that more complex programs 
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contain more errors than simpler programs, although only by up to a factor of four (Zage and 
Zage, 1993). Consequently, long simple spreadsheets will contain many more errors than short 
complex spreadsheets. Certainly, reporting complexity first and size half way down the list is a 
concern. 
Testing 
Even more of a concern is testing, including logic inspection. The framework gives almost no 
information on this topic. In fact, its advice on logic inspection—that logic should be done by a 
person (one person) other than the developer—flies in the face of what software developers have 
long known about code inspection in software development—that a single inspector will not find a 
high percentage of all errors. This inability of single testers to find a large percentage of errors is 
also replicated in spreadsheet inspection experiments (Galletta, et al., 1993, 1997; Panko, 1999). 
Fagan (1976) first argued that multi-person code inspection is needed, and subsequent corporate 
experience has confirmed this finding. 
In general, the PWC framework, like most other discussions of good spreadsheet practice today, 
spends almost no time on testing, treating it as just one of many considerations. However, 
software development experience shows that testing is quite difficult. As a consequence, a great 
deal of software development effort is spent in testing. 
Fault rates in programming are very similar to error rates in spreadsheet models (cf. Panko, 
2006a 2006b), as are detection rates in inspection (Galletta et al., 1993, 1997; Panko, 1999, cf. 
Panko 2006a). Programmers, appalled by actual fault rates3, spend a great deal of time on 
testing. In a sample of 84 projects in 27 organizations, Jones (1998) found that the amount of 
time spent in testing to reduce errors ranged from 27% to 34%, depending on program difficulty. 
In every case subjects reported that insufficient time was allotted to testing. In another study, 
Kimberland (2004) found that Microsoft software development teams spent 40% to 60% of their 
total working time in testing. 
Testing in programming is not simply one of many controls. It is the main control. Although good 
practice in defining, designing, and developing programs are all important, the residual error rate 
after good development still requires extensive testing. 
Another problem with the PWC framework is that it assumes a system development life cycle in 
which testing comes after development is finished. In software development, however, testing is 
done after each module, not at the end of development. Although unit testing for modules is only 
one stage in testing, it is a critical stage. The longer a piece of tested code is, the more difficult 
testing it will be. For example, in code inspection, in which a testing team pours over a module of 
code, there is strong empirical support for keeping modules small—only 100 to 200 lines of code. 
As module length increases, error detection rates fall precipitously. For example, Barnard and 
Price (1994) found that inspectors found 72% more errors when modules were smaller. 
Testing, then, proceeds throughout development. It is not a separate stage in the systems 
development life cycle. In addition, it is important to test each module during development. 
Another issue is that the PWC framework describes both testing and inspection but does not 
discuss how they are different. In testing, different sets of values for input variables are applied to 
the program (or spreadsheet), and the results are observed and checked. In inspection, the 
inspectors look over a program or spreadsheet line by line (or cell by cell) looking for errors. Both 
testing and inspection have strengths and weaknesses. However, although testing may seem like 
it would be simple to do, designing effective value sets for testing is surprisingly difficult (Glass, 
2003). In contrast, code inspection does not require specific skills, although it is important that 
inspectors follow a step-by-step methodology (Fagan, 1976). If done correctly, both testing and 
                                                     
3 In programming, defects in the program are called faults 
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inspection are capable of reducing error rates by 60% to 90%. However, if testing values are not 
well selected, error reduction suffers greatly. 
A third way to examine spreadsheets is auditing. In contrast to testing and inspection, which are 
designed to reduce errors heavily, auditing is primarily done to see if good practices were 
followed. Auditing only examines certain parts of the spreadsheet. Therefore, is only likely to find 
a small fraction of all errors. For compliance and corporate use, which both require greatly 
reduced error rates, auditing is completely inadequate. 
V. CONCLUSION: THE SPREADSHEET COMPLIANCE PARADOX 
Today, we have a puzzling situation. First, spreadsheets are widely used in financial reporting 
and many other business functions. 
Second, given the compliance requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley and several other laws, even a 
few spreadsheets that are incorrect to a material degree can result in severe consequences for 
the firm. 
Third, there is no doubt that human error rates in spreadsheet development are similar to those in 
software development and other human cognitive activities of comparable complexity. Even after 
careful development, we must expect errors in 1% to 5% of all lines of code. This means that all 
large spreadsheets contain many errors. We also know that nearly all large spreadsheets contain 
serious errors that reach the level of accounting materiality (Coopers and Lybrand, 1997) or 
decision impact (KPMG, 1998). 
Fourth, as noted earlier in this paper, a number of companies already were required to report 
control and error weaknesses associated with spreadsheets. 
Given these facts, we would expect corporations and regulators to pay close attention to 
spreadsheet development, including implementing extensive testing. Paradoxically, however, 
corporations are not imposing extensive testing and other development requirements on their 
spreadsheets, and regulators are not insisting on such measures. What we appear to have is 
sham compliance in which spreadsheets are not effectively controlled yet are being treated by 
everyone as if they are. 
However, this era of benign neglect in Sarbanes–Oxley may not continue for long. In the 
pharmaceuticals industry, 21 CFR 11 regulations imposed control requirements on spreadsheets 
since 1997. In this industry, a period of neglect was followed by a testing requirement, albeit a 
fairly loose testing requirement. Quite a few companies already received 21 CFR 11 warning 
letters from the Food and Drug Administration. Although the term “warning letter” may not sound 
serious, receiving a warning letter is a major concern for corporations in the industry and can 
result in a devastating impact on stock prices. 
Of course, error testing is not the only concern for spreadsheet compliance. Fraud controls are 
also crucial, and this area receives even less attention. Operational procedures, auditing, 
documentation methods, and secure spreadsheet operations all need to be developed. 
Fortunately, some of the technological solutions developed for 21 CFR 11 compliance programs 
in pharmaceuticals may be of help in spreadsheet security. However, operational procedures, 
documentation methods, and human controls are still badly in need of development. 
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